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Abstract
Informal payments for health care are a well-known phenomenon in many health care systems
around the world. While informal payments could be an important source of health care financing,
they have an adverse impact on efficiency and access to care, and are a major impediment to on-
going health care reforms. This paper aims to study the scale and patterns of informal patient pay-
ments for out-patient and in-patient services in three former-socialist countries: Bulgaria, Hungary
and Ukraine. The data are collected in 2010 and 2011 based on national representative samples and
are analysed in pooled models to explain variations in payments. The results of the cross-country
comparison suggest a relatively higher prevalence of informal patient payments in Ukraine and
Hungary than in Bulgaria, where patients also have to pay formal user charges in the public sector.
Nevertheless, informal payments for hospitalization in Bulgaria are quite extensive. We observe
some differences in informal payments across the years. Variations in payment size are mainly ex-
plained by the nature, type and need for services, fee awareness and, on some occasions, by house-
hold income. Interpreted within the context of structural differences (e.g. reform paths, regulations,
funding, user fees, anti-corruption policies), the findings of our study have implications on how to
address informal payments for health care.
Keywords: Central and Eastern Europe, informal payments for health care, in-patient service, out-patient service, out-of-pocket
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Introduction
Informal payments for health care services are a well-known phe-
nomenon in many health care systems around the world (Balabanova
et al. 2004, Gaal et al. 2006, Lewis, 2002, Liaropoulos and Tragakes
1998, Teth et al. 1971, Vian et al. 2006).The phenomenon is very di-
verse ranging from small in-kind gifts through payments for consum-
ables and other goods, such as medicines, syringes, bandages or even
light bulbs and bed linen, brought by patients in order to receive
medical services (Gaal et al. 2006). Most often, informal payments
compensate for the shortage of health care resources, provide a
stimulus for physicians to remain in practice and allow patients to re-
ceive adequate care (Allin et al. 2006, Belli 2001, Gaal et al. 2006).
On the other hand, informal payments aggravate the efficiency
and equity problems in the health care system by distorting resource
allocation decisions and by impeding access to care for the
poor(Ensor 2004, Gaal and McKee 2004, 2005). Since the informal
cash-flow goes directly from the patient to the medical staff and re-
mains unregistered, these payments hinder the estimation of actual
health care expenditure as well as future funding requirements of the
health care sector (Delcheva et al. 1997, Ensor 2004). Thus, deeply
ingrained informal practices accepted by both providers and con-
sumers, and tolerated or neglected by the government, can become a
major impediment to ongoing reforms (Lewis 2002).
There is a great variety of empirical studies in terms of health
care providers studied, data collection methods as well as recall peri-
ods, not to mention the diversity of the definitions of informal pa-
tient payment applied (Stepurko et al. 2010). This makes the
comparisons of the results of single-country studies difficult, while
cross-country evidence on the scale of informal patient payments
from multi-country studies is rare (Central and Eastern European
Health Network 2003).
This paper aims to study the scale and patterns of informal patient
payments for out-patient and in-patient services in three former-
socialist countries: Bulgaria, Hungary and Ukraine. These countries
represent an interesting case for comparison because the existence of
informal patient payments is a well-recognized characteristic of their
health care systems, while the level of their socio-economic develop-
ment differs. The countries once shared a common socio-political
orientation under the communist regimes. However, their transition
to democracy and a market-oriented economy proceeded at different
speed, which places them at the moment at different stages of devel-
opment. Yet, informal patient payments present a policy challenge in
all three countries (Atanasova et al. 2010, Baji et al. 2012, Danyliv
et al. 2012, Rechel and McKee 2009). Hence, we compare the scale
and patterns of informal patient payments in these countries taking
into account the diversity of the countries’ health care systems and
general socio-economic context.
Our analysis makes an important contribution to the literature
on informal payments for health care, not only because of the cross-
country comparison, but also because the study distinguishes be-
tween informal cash payments paid to the health care provider for
service provision and payments for goods brought by the patient
into the health care facilities, although these goods are supposed to
be provided free-of-charge to the patient (Allin et al. 2006). This lat-
ter type of informal patient payments is rarely addressed in the lit-
erature but is considered to be important for the estimation of total
out-of-pocket payments in a country and of the severity of the health
care shortages in the public sector (Gaal et al. 2006).
The paper is organized as follows: the background section de-
scribes the country specific context, followed by a brief discussion of
the factors that influence informal payments for health care. The
methods section summarizes the data collection process and intro-
duces the variables used in the analysis. This is followed by presenta-
tion of results. Discussion and conclusion complete the paper.
Background
Although the three countries had a common socialistic past, now-
adays, the socio-economic and political climate in these countries
differs in many aspects. Hungary and Bulgaria became EU-members
in 2004 and 2007 respectively. During the past two decades, better
macro-indicators were observed in the case of Hungary, though the
Bulgarian economy currently shows a very respectable development.
Hungary is struggling in the aftermath of the financial crisis, espe-
cially by the total debt of roughly 80% of the GDP and a stagnating
economy. Meanwhile, Ukraine can be considered a contrasting case
to the other two countries, i.e. a non-EU-member, much lower
standards of living, ever-present corruption coupled with weak gov-
ernance (Pavlova et al. 2012).
Given this diversity of the political and socio-economic context,
the health care systems in the three countries differ as well. In
Hungary and Bulgaria, social health insurance has replaced the old
Semashko system, albeit health care reforms did not always have an
even nature. This is especially visible in the delayed structural
changes in hospital care provision in Bulgaria (Atanasova et al.
2011), which is in contrast to Hungary, where the number of acute
hospital beds was almost halved during the last 20 years (Gaal et al.
2006). At the same time, the Ukrainian health care system has not
achieved visible improvements, i.e. the publicly funded health sys-
tem is still financed via line-item budgets, infrastructure remains the
same as that during the Soviet time, and the system of GPs (general
practitioners or family physicians) is still undeveloped (Lekhan et al.
2010). Also, official salaries of medical staff continue to be per-
ceived as ‘low’, and in fact, they are lower than the average wage in
the industrial sector (State Statistics Committee of Ukraine2013).
This is a common feature shared with Bulgaria and Hungary, and
perceived by the medical profession as the key factor in the persist-
ence of informal payments (Gaal and McKee 2004 and 2005,
Key Messages
• A significantly higher number of users report informal payments to a specialist compared to GPs and also significantly
more frequent and higher payments are noted for surgery and pregnancy/childbirth except for emergency childbirth.
• In- patients pay higher amounts when the reason for the informal payment is better services as well as when requested
by medical staff.
• In addition to the informal payments, in Bulgaria, Hungary and Ukraine, respondents also report that they brought
goods for their last hospitalization at the medical staff’s request.
• Poor knowledge of the formal fee size is associated with higher amounts paid informally for the last physician visit.
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Hungarian Central Statistical Office 2013, National Statistical
Institute Bulgaria 2013).
In addition to the informal patient payments reported in the
three countries (Atanasova et al. 2011, Baji et al. 2012, Danyliv
et al. 2012), there are various formal and/or quasi-formal fees in the
public system. In Bulgaria, patients are obliged to pay a co-payment
for each out-patient visit and for each day of hospitalization for a
maximum of 10 days per year. Emergency care is officially free-of-
charge and some socio-economic groups are fully or partially ex-
empted. However, patients are not always conversant with the ex-
emption mechanism as well as with the exact amounts to be paid
(Atanasova et al. 2010, Rechel et al. 2011).
In Hungary, formal out-of-pocket payments for patient-doctor
encounters and for hospital stays were introduced in 2007 and abol-
ished in 2008 after a national referendum (Baji et al. 2012). Since
then, formal user charges are only applicable in case of certain den-
tist services, free choice of health care providers, when bypassing the
referral system, and for the above-standard accommodation and
meals during hospitalization. Cost sharing is quite extensive for
medical products (pharmaceuticals, medical aids and prostheses in
ambulatory care) (Gaal et al. 2011). Qualitative data suggest that
Hungarian patients would accept official service fees, if they
received an adequate service provision, which they assure at present
via informal payments, or in the expanding private sector (Baji et al.
2011).
In Ukraine, the Constitution guarantees free-of-charge health
care services, which virtually excludes any attempt to introduce for-
mal out-of-pocket payments. Nevertheless, a short list of patient
fees for ‘luxury’ health care services has been introduced by a gov-
ernment decree (Lekhan et al. 2010). Also, given the chronically
underfunded health care system, unregulated ‘charitable contribu-
tions’ to health care facilities (quasi-formal payments) became a
common practice.
By and large, the scale of informal payments is closely coupled
with the type of service consumed, as well as with the assertiveness
and rank of medical staff (Belli et al. 2004, Lewis 2007, Tomini and
Maarse 2011), which rather support the fee-for-service explanation of
the phenomenon. Informal payments are found to be more extensive
in a case of hospitalizations rather than physician visits, and are more
conspicuous in a case of surgeons and gynaecologists (Stepurko et al.
2010). In addition to this, other factors such as the overall corruption,
manner of health care provision and lack of patients’ satisfaction have
also been reported to be associated with informal payments (Cohen
2012, Radin 2009). Another interesting finding is the association be-
tween informal payments and the ignorance regarding entitlements to
health care (exclusions, official user charges, exemption rules, etc).
According to Mokhtari and Ashtari (2012) well-informed patients
have a lower probability of paying informally. This finding is worth
further study for two reasons. First, it suggests that informal payments
can be explained by the lack of knowledge on official entitlements,
which, in turn, implies that the prevalence of the phenomenon can be
decreased by the provision of information to the public. Second, the
finding is somewhat contradictory: if a patient did not know whether
or not there was any official user charge in effect for the service s/he
utilized, how did s/he know whether s/he paid a formal fee, or an in-
formal patient payment?
In our comparative study, we explore the association between in-
formal patient payments and a number of the above-mentioned
factors in the countries, which are represented in the empirical data
by the country citizenship identifier and indicators of patients’
knowledge about the fee, type of service consumed, purpose of in-
formal payments as well as its initiator.
Methods
We use national representative data collected in two successive years
(July-August 2010 and 2011) in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ukraine.
The country samples are drawn based on a multi-staged random
probability approach: after the selection of sampling points (accord-
ing to regional, urban/rural and ethnic characteristics), about 10
addresses/households per sampling point are chosen using the ran-
dom route method. One household member older than 18 years is
selected for the survey using the ‘last birthday’ principle. The data
collection was finalized after having about 1000 and 800 interviews
per country in 2010 and 2011 respectively. A description of key
socio-demographic variables and response rates per country per year
can be found in Supplementary Material, Table S1. Individuals, who
refused or were unable to participate, were replaced following the
same selection approach. Additionally, about 0.5–4% of the ques-
tionnaires per country were not included in the analysis after quality
control and because of inconsistencies in the answers.
Respondents were interviewed face-to-face in their homes using
a standardized questionnaire identical for all countries.
Supplementary Material, Table S2 presents the exact English word-
ing of the questions analysed in this paper. In 2010 and 2011,
respondents were asked about their consumption and expenditure
(total and informal) on out- and in-patient health care services dur-
ing the preceding 12 months. For informal patient payments, re-
spondents were asked to include both cash payment and the value of
in-kind gifts. Socio-demographic data were surveyed in both years.
In 2011, more detailed information was collected on payments
for the last visit to a physician and last hospitalization, including
type of care, size of formal and informal payments, purpose and
mechanism of the informal payment, as well as payments for other
goods (e.g. medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, bed linen, food) that
the patient brought for the treatment (in-kind contribution). To re-
duce recall bias, we exclude from the analysis visits and hospitaliza-
tions which have taken place before 2009 and include information
on the last physician visit and last hospitalization that have taken
place since 2009 only (i.e. in the preceding 2.5 years, from January
2009 till the time of data collection – the Summer of 2010). In add-
ition to potential recall bias, the limitations of our study are related
to the length of the period covered (only 2–3 subsequent years),
cross-sectional design of the surveys, and the sensitive nature of the
questions on informal patient payments.
The two types of data collection, i.e. annual informal payments
for health care services and informal payments for the last visit/hos-
pitalization, serve two different research purposes: the former is to
address the scale of the phenomenon and the latter is to understand
the process. It is not possible to obtain information on the magni-
tude of informal payments, if only payments for the last visit/hospi-
talization are studied, while data on annual payments alone are not
sufficient to analyse the process of informal payments. Therefore,
we do not compare annual payments and payments for the last phys-
ician visit/hospitalization in our analysis, the two approaches are
used to complement each other.
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Regarding the scale of informal payments, both mean and me-
dian values of the amounts1 spent either totally or informally on
health care services, are presented in the Tables 1 and 2. However,
the data presented in the text are the median values.
We use binary logistic regression analysis to determine the extent
to which socio-demographic features as well as other factors (e.g. year
of service consumption, quantity of services used) including structural
factors (country citizenship, fee awareness, nature, type of service) are
associated with the experience of paying informally and bringing
goods during the last hospitalization at the staff’s requests.
Considering possible non-linear effects, such variables indicating year,
fee awareness, residence place and type of service are included as bin-
ary indicators in the regression analyses. Related to type of service, GP
visit is taken as the base category in last physician model since it pre-
sents the least complicated care. For the same reason, planned proced-
ure not related to pregnancy/childbirth is taken as the base service
category in the last hospitalization model2.Binary logistic regression
analyses is performed on health care users only. The correlation be-
tween the independent variables included in the analysis is weak (cor-
relation coefficient<0.6) or insignificant (P>0.05).
Also, we carry out linear regression analysis with the amounts
paid informally (either during the year prior to the survey or for the
last visit/hospitalization), as well as with the monetary value of
goods brought during the last hospitalization on staff’s requests. In
case of the last visit/hospitalization, we use an extended set of inde-
pendent variables, which also includes factors such as the purpose of
the informal payment (better attention, better services or other rea-
sons) and the initiator of the payment (expected/required by medical
Table 1. Health care services consumption and payments during the last 12 monthsa
Bulgaria Hungary Ukraine
2010 2011 2010 2011 2010 2011
Use of out-patient (phys-
ician) services during
the last 12 months
No N(%) 239 (24.5) 226 (27.7) 207 (20.0) 123 (15.3) 426 (42.7) 345 (43.2)
Yes N(%) 735 (75.5) 589 (72.3) 826 (80.0) 682 (84.7) 572 (57.3) 454 (56.8)
Number of visits Median 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 2.00
Mean (SD) 5.81 (6.48) 5.50 (5.74) 6.58 (6.29) 6.51 (7.05) 3.45 (4.25) 2.88 (3.82)
Payments for out-patient
(physician) services by
users
No N(%) 172 (24.2) 92 (16.0) 594 (72.7) 483 (70.8) 246 (43.3) 213 (47.1)
Yes N(%) 540 (75.8) 483 (84.0) 223 (27.3) 199 (29.2) 322 (56.7) 236 (52.6)
Total payments Median 6.1 5.2 36.4 37.8 19.2 20.7
Mean (SD) 27.33 (83.3) 19.0 (51.4) 80.3 (115.5) 73.9 (101.8) 60.8 (123.5) 85.8 (153.1)
Informal payments for
out-patient (physician)
services by users
No N(%) 658 (90.3) 539 (91.8) 647 (78.8) 540 (79.2) 359 (63.3) 294 (65.0)
Yes N(%) 71 (9.7) 48 (8.2) 174 (21.2) 142 (20.8) 208 (36.7) 158 (35.0)
Total informal
payments
Median 14.1 10.4 36.4 37.8 9.6 10.4
Mean (SD) 29.1 (36.2) 23.8 (35.9) 61.3 (80.1) 75.3 (100.8) 32.2 (62.4) 52.8 (121.2)
Knowledge of the official
fees for physician’s
services
Never N(%) 88 (12.7) 88 (15.9) 570 (69.4) 468 (68.7) 280 (49.0) 284 (62.6)
Somewhat N(%) 207 (29.9) 172 (31.0) 185 (22.5) 163 (23.9) 227 (39.7) 130 (28.6)
Always N(%) 397 (57.4) 294 (53.1) 66 (8.0) 50 (7.3) 65 (11.4) 40 (8.8)
Use of in-patient (hos-
pital) services during
the last 12 months
No N(%) 831 (83.0) 689 (84.3) 817 (78.9) 656 (81.5) 816 (81.6) 647 (81.1)
Yes N(%) 170 (17.0) 128 (15.7) 219 (21.1) 149 (18.5) 184 (18.4) 151 (18.9)
Number of
hospitalizations
Median 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Mean (SD) 1.73 (2.59) 1.52 (0.96) 1.88 (2.17) 1.69 (1.82) 1.48 (0.81) 1.34 (0.81)
Payments for in-patient
(hospital) services by
users
No N(%) 52 (33.1) 45 (36.9) 115 (53.2) 58 (38.9) 48 (27.0) 37 (25.2)
Yes N(%) 105 (66.9) 77 (63.1) 101 (46.8) 91 (61.1) 130 (73.0) 110 (74.8)
Total payments Median 25.6 25.0 90.9 75.6 95.9 155.3
Mean (SD) 91.1 (153.1) 103.0 (197.4) 134.8 (131.3) 121.5 (126.4) 195.9 (235.2) 219.2 (219.5)
Informal payments for in-
patient (hospital) ser-
vices by users
No N(%) 120 (78.4) 108 (88.5) 119 (55.1) 62 (42.2) 87 (49.4) 84 (57.1)
Yes N(%) 33 (21.6) 14 (11.5) 97 (44.9) 85 (57.8) 89 (50.6) 63 (42.9)
Total informal
payments
Median 10.2 31.3 100.0 75.6 38.3 51.8
Mean (SD) 98.5 (188.7) 113.2 (236.3) 123.7 (122.8) 107.1 (101.1) 81.2 (121.1) 145.0 (185.7)
Knowledge of the official
fees for hospital
services
Never N(%) 31 (20.3) 32 (23.5) 154 (70.6) 100 (67.6) 87 (47.3) 96 (63.6)
Somewhat N(%) 46 (30.1) 44 (38.3) 47 (21.6) 36 (24.3) 65 (35.3) 38 (25.2)
Always N(%) 76 (49.7) 39 (33.9) 17 (7.8) 12 (8.1) 32 (17.4) 17 (11.3)
aAll amounts in the table are presented in Euro. Firstly, in local currency for 2011 and 2009 amounts are converted to 2010 values based on Consumer Price
Index per country (source: World Bank), then converted from local currency to Euro based on average conversion rate for 2010 (source: ESB).
1 Endnotes
All variables that present amounts in national currency (pay-
ments or value of goods) are first adjusted for inflation (base
year 2010) using data provided by the World Bank’s
Consumer Price Index (World Bank 2012). The adjusted
amounts are then converted into Euros using the average ex-
change rate for 2010 (ESB Consultancy 2012). We also run the
linear regression analysis after a conversion of the amounts
into Int.$PPP but we do not notice significant differences.
Thus, we only present results for amounts in Euro.
2 The indicators of the hospitalization type are compiled from
two original variables on (a) the type of hospitalization (four
answer options: planned surgery, planned procedure, emer-
gency surgery, emergency procedure) and (b) whether the last
hospitalization was related to pregnancy or childbirth into
seven indicators. Planned procedure not related to pregnancy/
childbirth was taken as a base category as it is expected to be
the least complicated type of hospital care.
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Table 2 Informal payments for the last physician visit/hospitalization (2009-2011)a
Bulgaria Hungary Ukraine
Date of the last visit to/by
physician
2009–2011 (30 months) N(%) 683 (84) 722 (90) 546 (68)
Before 2009 N(%) 59 (7) 23 (3) 52 (7)
None N(%) 56 (7) 45 (5) 178 (22)
Do not know N(%) 19 (2) 15 (2) 24 (3)
Physician’s specialization
- last visit
General practitioner N(%) 458 (67) 446 (62) 67 (12)
Internist N(%) 61 (9) 99 (14) 283 (59)
Obstetrician-gynecologist N(%) 33 (4) 56 (8) 58 (11)
Other specialist N(%) 130 (19) 120 (16) 138 (20)
Payment for the last visit
to a physician
No N(%) 148 (22.4) 613 (85.0) 314 (58.0)
Yes N(%) 514 (77.6) 108 (15.0) 227 (42.0)
Payment size Median 1.0 18.8 10.4
Mean (SD) 5.5 (24.8) 24.6 (25.6) 42.7 (107.9)
Informal payment for the
last visit to a physician
No N(%) 651 652 404
Yes N(%) 27 (4.0) 70 (9.7) 138 (25.5)
Payment size Median 10.4 11.3 8.8
Mean (SD) 17.1 (29.5) 25.7 (30.0) 19.1 (39.8)
Main purpose of the in-
formal payment for the
last physician visit
Better attention N(%) 4 (15.4) 35 (50.0) 62 (44.9)
Better service N(%) 14 (53.9) 19 (27.9) 35 (25.4)
Other purpose (e.g. access) N(%) 8 (30.7) 16 (22.8) 41 (29.7)
Requested informal pay-
ments for the last phys-
ician visits
Requested by staff N(%) 17 (63.0) 4 (5.8) 57 (41.3)
Initiated by the patient only N(%) 10 (37.0) 65 (94.2) 81 (58.7)
Date of the last
hospitalization
2009-2011 (30 months) N(%) 201 (25) 275 (34) 219 (27)
Before 2009 N(%) 230 (28) 178 (41) 72 (21)
None N(%) 369 (45) 180 (22) 390 (49)
Do not know N(%) 17 (2) 22 (3) 26 (3)
Type of last
hospitalization
Emergency (not planned) N(%) 86 (43) 114 (41.5) 140 (64.2)
Surgery (not procedure) N(%) 57 (28.5) 100 (36.4) 42 (28.7)
Delivery N(%) 18 (9) 23 (8.4) 28 (12.9)
Payment for the last
hospitalization
No N(%) 75 (40.1) 145 (53.5) 59 (29.4)
Yes N(%) 112 (59.9) 126 (46.5) 142 (70.6)
Payment size Median 20.8 56.7 87.7
Mean (SD) 73.1 (151.6) 76.1 (63.9) 162.8 (187.0)
Informal payment for the
last hospitalization
No N(%) 167 (85.6) 152 (51.9) 122 (59.5)
Yes N(%) 28 (14.4) 120 (44.1) 83 (40.5)
Payment size Median 25.6 52.2 43.8
Mean (SD) 74.7 (174.2) 68.6 (57.5) 103.8 (148.5)
Pharmaceuticals brought
by the patient to the
hospital
No N(%) 166 (84.3) 221 (80.4) 48 (22.2)
Yes N(%) 31 (15.7) 54 (19.6) 168 (77.8)
Total monetary value Median 15.6 8.5 62.1
Mean (SD) 37.8 (99.3) 14.2 (16.1) 104.51(117.1)
Medical supplies brought
by the patient to the
hospital
No N(%) 179 (90.9) 245 (89.1) 91 (42.3)
Yes N(%) 18 (9.1) 30 (10.9) 124 (57.7)
Total monetary value Median 15.3 21.6 10.4
Mean (SD) 276.7 (694.2) 33.6 (31.8) 21.0 (27.4)
Bed linen and food
brought by the patient
to the hospital
No N(%) 168 (84.8) 241 (87.6) 108 (49.5)
Yes N(%) 30 (15.2) 34 (12.4) 110 (50.5)
Main purpose of the in-
formal payment for the
last hospitalization
Better attention N(%) 11 (39.3) 56 (46.7) 35 (42.2)
Better service N(%) 6 (21.4) 48 (40.0) 27 (32.5)
Other purpose N(%) 11 (39.3) 16 (13.3) 21 (25.3)
Requested informal pay-
ments for the last
hospitalization
Requested by staff N(%) 5(17.9) 14 (11.7) 32 (38.6)
Initiated by the patient only N(%) 23 (82.1) 106 (88.3) 51 (61.4)
aAll amounts in the table are presented in Euro. Firstly, in local currency for 2011 and 2009 amounts are converted to 2010 values based on Consumer Price
Index per country (source: World Bank), then converted from local currency to Euro based on average conversion rate for 2010 (source: ESB).
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staff or solely initiated by the patient). This part of the analysis in-
cludes only the health care users, who paid informally.
We first run the regressions per country. Then, we pool the data
for the three countries and analyse them together including country
indicators (Hungary is taken as a reference category). When com-
pared to the country models, the pooled-data models do not lead to
different conclusions although occasionally we miss some significant
or insignificant effects per country. In this paper, we only present
the pooled-data regression models. In all pooled-data models, when-
ever possible, we include an interaction between year and country
indicators to check for year difference per country.
Results
Descriptive statistics
As Tables 1 and 2 indicate (for both the preceding 12 months and
last visit/hospitalization), patient payments for health care services
exist in all three countries. However, in Bulgaria, these are mainly
official payments since the share of service users who pay informally
is much lower than the proportion of users who make any payment.
In contrast, in Hungary, these two proportions are rather similar per
service type, which means that informal payments predominate in
this country. By the same token, in Ukraine, both types of payments
(namely quasi-official and informal payments) are spread. In all
three countries, the proportion of in-patient service users who pay
informally as well as the amounts spent on in-patient care are higher
compared to that in out-patient care. We also observe in Tables 1
and 2 that the mean values for all countries are much higher than
the median values, while the standard deviations are much larger
than the mean values. This indicates a large variability in the
amounts stated by the respondents. Below, we refer to the median
values, which are not affected by outliers.
The annual informal payments for out-patient services are reported
by 9.7% of Bulgarian health care users in 2010 and 8.2% in 2011 (a
median value of 14.1 and 10.4 Euro per year per payer in 2010 and
2011 respectively), 21.2% of Hungarian health care users in 2010 and
20.8% in 2011 (a median value of 36.4 and 37.8Euro, respectively)
and 36.7 and 35.0% of Ukrainian health care users(a median value of
9.6 and 10.4Euro respectively) (see Table 1). For informal payments
for the last physician visit, 4.0, 9.7 and 25.5% paid informally in the
respective countries (a median value of 10.4Euro in Bulgaria,
11.3 Euro in Hungary and 8.8Euro in Ukraine per visit per payer) (see
Table 2).
In case of in-patient services in the preceding year, 21.6% of the
health care users in 2010 and 11.5% in 2011 paid informally in
Bulgaria, 44.9% and 57.8% in Hungary, while 50.6% and 42.9%
in Ukraine. The median amount of the informal payment is
31.3Euro per year per payer in Bulgaria in 2011, 75.6 Euro in
Hungary and 51.8 Euro in Ukraine (Table 1). Regarding the last
hospitalization (Table 2), in Hungary, 44.1% paid informally me-
dian value of 52.2 Euro per payer and in Ukraine, 40.5% paid infor-
mally median value of 43.8 Euro. In Bulgaria, this proportion is
lower (14.4% paid informally with a median value of 25.6 Euro).
Table 2 provides additional information on the main reason for
the informal payment during the last physician visit/hospitalization
and on the payment initiator (staff or patient).In all three countries,
the most frequent reason mentioned is ‘better attention’ of the med-
ical staff (50 and 46.7%in Hungary and 44.9 and 42.2% in Ukraine
for out- and in-patient services respectively, and 39.3% in Bulgaria
for in-patient services). In case of out-patient service in Bulgaria,
‘better service’ (53.9%) is indicated as the main reason. ‘Better
service’ is also quite often mentioned as the main reason of making
informal payments for hospitalizations (40%) in Hungary, where
virtually all patients (94.2% of out-patients and 88.3% of in-
patients), who paid informally, do this on their own initiative. In
Ukraine, the share of out- and in-patients, who initiated informal
payments is somewhat lower: 58.7 and 61.4%, respectively.
Bulgaria is an interesting mix: where 82.1% of in-patients initiated
informal payment by themselves in contrast to 63.0% of out-
patients who report that the informal payment was requested.
About half of the respondents in Bulgaria always know the fee
size in contrast to the much smaller shares in Hungary and Ukraine
(see Table 1). Though, in 2011about 15.9% of out-patients and
about 23.5% of in-patients in Bulgaria report that they never knew
the size of the formal fee.
In addition to the informal payments, in all three countries, re-
spondents also report that they brought goods for their last hospital-
ization at the medical staff’s request (see the data at the bottom of
Table 2). This includes pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, but also
bed linen and food. The percentage of those, who brought such
items to the hospital, is rather similar in Bulgaria and Hungary: 15–
20% in the case of pharmaceuticals, about 10% in the case of med-
ical supplies, and 10–15% in the case of bed linen and food. In
Ukraine, these shares are much higher: 77.8% brought pharmaceut-
icals, 57.7% medical supplies and 50.5% bed linen. Also, the data
show a relatively moderate median value of pharmaceuticals
brought by patients in Bulgaria (15.6 Euro per hospitalization) and
Hungary (8.5 Euro) in contrast to Ukraine (62.1 Euro). At the same
time, the median value of medical supplies brought by patients is the
highest in Hungary (21.6 Euro).
Results of the regression analyses on informal patient
payments
Table 3 presents the results of the binary logistic and linear regres-
sion analyses based on the annual informal payments for out-patient
and in-patient services, and for the last visit/hospitalization. The re-
sults indicate that in 2010 (reference year category), compared to
Hungary (reference country category), the number of out-patient
users who paid informally in the preceding 12 month, was signifi-
cantly higher in Ukraine and lower in Bulgaria (P<0.05) but there
were no statistically significant cross-country differences with regard
to the annual amounts of informal payments (see annual physician
visits models). The last physician visit models confirm that payments
for physician visits in 2010 in Ukraine were less frequent than in
Hungary (P<0.1), and that there are no statistically significant dif-
ferences in payments across countries. For hospitalization in 2010,
we observe the same pattern for Bulgaria, i.e. a significantly lower
number of informal payers in Bulgaria compared to Hungary in
both the annual model and last hospitalization model (P<0.05).
But we also observe significantly higher payments for the last hospi-
talization in 2010 in Bulgaria (P<0.05) and Ukraine (P<0.1) com-
pared to Hungary.
For physician visits (see all four physician visits models), the fre-
quency of paying informally and informal payment size remain vir-
tually the same over the years, except for informal payments for the
last physician visit in Hungary in 2009 which are less frequent than
in 2010 (see coefficient for 2009, P<0.05). However, for hospital-
ization, informal payments for hospital services became more likely
in Hungary in 2011 (see coefficient for 2011, P<0.05), and less
likely in Bulgaria (see interaction Bulgaria*2011, P<0.05) and
Ukraine (see interaction Ukraine*2011, P<0.1).However, the an-
nual amount of informal payment for hospitalizations in Ukraine
458 Health Policy and Planning, 2017, Vol. 32, No. 4
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/heapol/article-abstract/32/4/453/2593595
by Hungary EISZ Consortium user
on 17 May 2018
T
a
b
le
3
In
fo
rm
a
l
p
a
y
m
e
n
ts
fo
r
se
rv
ic
e
s—
re
su
lt
s
o
fr
e
g
re
ss
io
n
a
n
a
ly
si
sa
P
h
y
si
ci
a
n
v
is
it
s
H
o
sp
it
a
li
za
ti
o
n
s
A
n
n
u
a
l,
y
ea
r
L
a
st
p
h
y
si
ci
a
n
v
is
it
A
n
n
u
a
l,
y
ea
r
L
a
st
h
o
sp
it
a
li
za
ti
o
n
U
se
r
m
a
d
e
in
fo
rm
a
l
p
a
y
m
en
ts
[0
-N
o
;1
-Y
es
]
S
IZ
E
in
E
u
ro
U
se
r
m
a
d
e
in
fo
rm
a
l
p
a
y
m
en
ts
[0
-N
o
;1
-Y
es
]
S
IZ
E
in
E
u
ro
U
se
r
m
a
d
e
in
fo
rm
a
l
p
a
y
m
en
ts
[0
-N
o
;1
-Y
es
]
S
IZ
E
in
E
u
ro
U
se
r
m
a
d
e
in
fo
rm
a
l
p
a
y
m
en
ts
[0
-N
o
;1
-Y
es
]
S
IZ
E
in
E
u
ro
T
y
p
e
o
f
re
g
re
ss
io
n
a
n
a
ly
si
s
B
in
a
ry
lo
g
is
ti
c
L
in
ea
r
B
in
a
ry
lo
g
is
ti
c
L
in
ea
r
B
in
a
ry
lo
g
is
ti
c
L
in
ea
r
B
in
a
ry
lo
g
is
ti
c
L
in
ea
r
C
o
u
n
tr
y
in
d
ic
a
to
r:
H
u
n
g
a
ry
–
b
a
se
ca
te
g
o
ry
B
u
lg
a
ri
a
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
0
.9
5
8
*
–
1
7
.9
9
4
2
0
.9
2
4
2
1
7
.8
3
0
2
1
.0
0
0
*
2
4
3
.9
3
5
2
1
.0
0
0
*
8
5
.5
3
7
*
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.1
9
3
)
(1
4
.7
7
6
)
(0
.6
2
5
)
(2
0
.5
9
6
)
(0
.3
1
6
)
(3
3
.5
9
3
)
(0
.5
0
8
)
(4
2
.4
5
9
)
U
k
ra
in
e
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
1
.0
6
4
*
2
8
.8
3
4
0
.8
6
7
*
*
2
1
1
.8
1
0
0
.4
5
7
2
2
7
.6
7
1
0
.6
2
1
6
4
.8
0
9
*
*
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.1
7
5
)
(1
2
.9
4
1
)
(0
.4
8
0
)
(1
5
.0
1
7
)
(0
.2
9
4
)
(2
9
.1
4
5
)
(0
.4
3
2
)
(3
3
.3
9
8
)
Y
ea
r:
2
0
1
0
–
b
a
se
ca
te
g
o
ry
Y
ea
r:
2
0
0
9
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
2
1
.8
4
5
*
2
2
9
.6
3
4
2
2
2
0
.1
7
0
2
7
.5
2
6
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.6
2
2
)
(2
1
.4
0
3
)
2
2
(0
.3
6
0
)
(2
5
.8
0
3
)
Y
ea
r:
2
0
1
1
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
0
.0
4
6
7
.3
6
4
2
0
.2
8
6
2
1
2
.1
5
8
0
.4
7
2
*
2
3
0
.6
2
5
0
.2
1
3
5
.0
8
6
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.1
3
7
)
(1
0
.2
8
7
)
(0
.4
1
3
)
(1
3
.7
8
7
)
(0
.2
3
5
)
(2
1
.4
4
0
)
(0
.3
4
4
)
(2
3
.9
8
9
)
C
o
u
n
tr
y
*
Y
ea
r
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
s
B
u
lg
a
ri
a
*
2
0
0
9
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
ex
cl
u
d
ed
e
ex
cl
u
d
ed
e
2
2
2
0
.9
2
7
2
2
3
.1
8
7
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.8
3
9
)
(7
3
.6
0
6
)
B
u
lg
a
ri
a
*
2
0
1
1
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
0
.1
7
0
2
2
3
.9
7
8
2
0
.3
1
2
1
.0
6
5
2
1
.1
0
4
*
6
8
.6
4
6
2
0
.6
3
0
2
9
6
.1
4
1
*
*
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.2
5
5
)
(2
0
.7
1
8
)
(0
.6
6
9
)
(2
2
.7
4
2
)
(0
.4
3
6
)
(4
9
.7
0
2
)
(0
.6
1
7
)
(5
0
.7
8
1
)
U
k
ra
in
e*
2
0
0
9
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
ex
cl
u
d
ed
e
ex
cl
u
d
ed
e
2
2
0
.0
2
4
2
8
4
.9
2
9
*
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.5
8
8
)
(4
1
.5
7
2
)
U
k
ra
in
e*
2
0
1
1
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
0
.0
6
8
1
2
.6
2
2
0
.2
4
2
0
.9
3
3
2
0
.5
8
0
*
*
9
6
.7
2
7
*
2
0
.4
6
8
2
2
4
.5
4
2
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.1
9
6
)
(1
4
.0
4
3
)
(0
.4
7
3
)
(1
5
.2
0
4
)
(0
.3
3
6
)
(3
1
.9
5
5
)
(0
.4
9
9
)
(3
5
.9
3
9
)
F
ee
a
w
a
re
n
es
s:
N
ev
er
–
b
a
se
ca
te
g
o
ry
F
ee
a
w
a
re
n
es
s:
S
o
m
et
im
es
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
0
.4
8
5
*
3
.3
7
5
0
.6
4
4
*
2
1
2
.3
6
2
*
0
.7
9
0
*
1
0
.4
6
2
0
.6
6
8
*
2
1
2
.2
8
2
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.1
0
3
)
(7
.3
4
8
)
(0
.1
7
6
)
(5
.3
8
5
)
(0
.1
8
2
)
(1
6
.9
1
6
)
(0
.2
3
8
)
(1
6
.7
5
6
)
F
ee
a
w
a
re
n
es
s:
A
lw
a
y
s
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
0
.2
9
3
*
2
0
.6
9
7
*
0
.7
5
1
*
2
9
.3
6
5
0
.3
1
8
4
7
.7
2
0
*
*
0
.5
6
3
*
*
2
.4
5
1
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.1
4
1
)
(9
.9
6
7
)
(0
.2
5
0
)
(7
.7
3
9
)
(0
.2
2
3
)
(2
2
.0
2
8
)
(0
.3
1
1
)
(2
3
.9
9
2
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
p
h
y
si
ci
a
n
:
G
P
–
b
a
se
ca
te
g
o
ry
In
te
rn
is
t
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
0
.9
8
7
*
2
.2
1
0
2
2
2
2
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.2
2
7
)
(7
.2
8
0
)
O
b
st
et
ri
ci
a
n
–
G
y
n
ec
o
lo
g
is
t
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
1
.1
1
0
*
2
1
.8
7
3
2
2
2
2
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.2
9
4
)
(9
.7
7
6
)
O
th
er
sp
ec
ia
li
st
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
0
.8
1
5
*
1
1
.3
0
0
2
2
2
2
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.2
3
2
)
(7
.7
3
5
)
T
y
p
e
o
f
h
o
sp
it
a
li
za
ti
o
n
:
P
la
n
ed
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
n
o
t
re
la
te
d
to
ch
il
d
b
ir
th
–
b
a
se
ca
te
g
o
ry
E
m
er
g
en
cy
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
n
o
t
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
.2
6
0
1
2
.1
3
9
b
ir
th
-r
el
a
te
d
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.3
0
4
)
(2
3
.8
8
3
)
P
la
n
n
ed
su
rg
er
y
n
o
t
re
la
te
d
to
b
ir
th
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
.2
6
1
*
4
1
.8
6
6
*
*
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.3
4
9
)
(2
4
.5
9
2
)
(c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
)
Health Policy and Planning, 2017, Vol. 32, No. 4 459
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/heapol/article-abstract/32/4/453/2593595
by Hungary EISZ Consortium user
on 17 May 2018
T
a
b
le
3
(c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
)
P
h
y
si
ci
a
n
v
is
it
s
H
o
sp
it
a
li
za
ti
o
n
s
A
n
n
u
a
l,
y
ea
r
L
a
st
p
h
y
si
ci
a
n
v
is
it
A
n
n
u
a
l,
y
ea
r
L
a
st
h
o
sp
it
a
li
za
ti
o
n
U
se
r
m
a
d
e
in
fo
rm
a
l
p
a
y
m
en
ts
[0
-N
o
;1
-Y
es
]
S
IZ
E
in
E
u
ro
U
se
r
m
a
d
e
in
fo
rm
a
l
p
a
y
m
en
ts
[0
-N
o
;1
-Y
es
]
S
IZ
E
in
E
u
ro
U
se
r
m
a
d
e
in
fo
rm
a
l
p
a
y
m
en
ts
[0
-N
o
;1
-Y
es
]
S
IZ
E
in
E
u
ro
U
se
r
m
a
d
e
in
fo
rm
a
l
p
a
y
m
en
ts
[0
-N
o
;1
-Y
es
]
S
IZ
E
in
E
u
ro
E
m
er
g
en
cy
su
rg
er
y
n
o
t
b
ir
th
-r
el
a
te
d
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
2
2
2
2
0
.8
2
2
*
*
6
4
.2
6
3
*
*
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.4
5
2
)
(3
2
.6
3
2
)
P
la
n
n
ed
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
re
la
te
d
to
b
ir
th
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
.3
4
6
*
8
2
.5
5
3
*
[0
-N
o
;1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.5
3
8
)
(3
7
.4
0
6
)
E
m
er
g
en
cy
p
ro
ce
d
u
re
re
la
te
d
to
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
.1
5
2
*
6
3
.0
8
9
*
*
ch
il
d
b
ir
th
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.4
7
1
)
(3
4
.0
3
9
)
P
la
n
n
ed
su
rg
er
y
ch
il
d
b
ir
th
-r
el
a
te
d
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
.5
6
6
*
6
5
.6
8
2
*
*
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.5
6
0
)
(3
7
.0
5
8
)
E
m
er
g
en
cy
su
rg
er
y
ch
il
d
b
ir
th
-r
el
a
te
d
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
.2
8
5
*
8
4
.5
5
2
*
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.7
5
8
)
(4
2
.3
5
9
)
P
a
id
fo
r
b
et
te
r
se
rv
ic
e
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
2
5
.4
0
1
*
*
2
2
2
3
6
.3
5
3
*
*
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(2
.9
1
9
)
(2
0
.4
7
1
)
P
a
id
fo
r
b
et
te
r
a
tt
en
ti
o
n
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
2
2
5
.4
6
7
*
*
2
2
2
2
4
.1
2
6
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(2
.9
2
1
)
(2
0
.2
2
7
)
A
sk
ed
to
p
a
y
in
fo
rm
a
ll
y
b
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
2
0
.1
9
0
2
2
2
1
0
3
.5
0
8
*
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.2
5
7
)
(1
9
.6
6
6
)
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
v
is
it
s/
h
o
sp
it
a
li
za
ti
o
n
s/
n
ig
h
ts
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
0
.0
6
0
*
4
.2
4
2
*
2
2
0
.1
3
5
*
2
6
.2
6
2
*
0
.0
1
2
0
.3
0
3
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.4
9
0
)
2
2
(0
.0
5
8
)
(4
.1
6
2
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.4
0
2
)
A
g
e
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
0
.0
0
3
2
.0
2
1
0
.0
0
0
2
.4
0
7
*
2
0
.0
0
6
0
.4
2
2
2
0
.0
0
3
0
.5
6
2
[Y
ea
rs
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.0
0
3
)
(0
.2
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
6
)
(0
.1
7
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.5
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.6
0
5
)
G
en
d
er
[0
-M
a
le
;
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
0
.3
6
8
*
2
4
.7
9
2
0
.2
8
5
*
*
6
.2
1
5
0
.1
2
8
2
7
.4
7
1
2
.7
7
1
*
4
4
.7
3
5
1
-F
em
a
le
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.0
9
3
)
(7
.0
1
9
)
(0
.1
7
0
)
(5
.5
0
0
)
(0
.1
5
3
)
(1
5
.4
5
6
)
(0
.4
4
9
)
(3
1
.5
2
1
)
R
es
id
en
ce
:
V
il
la
g
e
–
b
a
se
ca
te
g
o
ry
R
es
id
en
ce
:
T
o
w
n
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
0
.5
0
9
*
1
2
.6
8
1
2
0
.1
3
6
6
.8
7
8
2
0
.5
1
8
*
7
.2
7
2
2
0
.2
2
4
4
.0
7
8
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.1
0
7
)
(7
.9
3
5
)
(0
.1
9
7
)
(6
.3
7
3
)
(0
.1
8
0
)
(1
7
.4
5
4
)
(0
.2
4
1
)
(1
7
.5
8
8
)
R
es
id
en
ce
:
C
it
y
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
0
.1
6
8
3
.9
6
3
0
.2
4
6
3
.8
5
4
2
0
.4
2
0
*
*
3
6
.1
5
7
*
*
2
0
.1
0
1
2
5
.0
6
0
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.1
1
9
)
(4
.4
9
9
)
(0
.2
1
3
)
(6
.7
2
6
)
(0
.2
1
5
)
(2
0
.1
9
4
)
(0
.2
8
8
)
(2
1
.5
3
9
)
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
[f
ro
m
0
-I
S
C
E
D
0
to
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
0
.0
6
7
2
.9
1
3
2
0
.0
4
1
2
.2
3
9
0
.0
3
5
2
2
.1
5
5
2
0
.0
9
9
3
.5
8
2
5
-I
S
C
E
D
5
þ
6
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.0
4
2
)
(3
.0
9
6
)
(0
.0
7
5
)
(2
.3
7
8
)
(0
.0
7
4
)
(7
.3
5
8
)
(0
.0
9
2
)
(6
.8
3
3
)
H
ea
lt
h
p
ro
b
le
m
sc
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
0
.5
1
8
*
4
.4
8
7
0
.1
8
9
1
5
.7
6
2
*
0
.4
2
9
*
2
2
.9
8
6
0
.6
8
1
*
4
2
.0
0
2
*
[0
-N
o
;
1
-Y
es
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.1
0
7
)
(7
.8
8
1
)
(0
.1
8
8
)
(6
.1
5
2
)
(0
.1
9
0
)
(1
9
.4
0
5
)
(0
.2
7
1
)
(2
0
.1
6
9
)
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
p
er
so
n
s
in
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
0
.0
3
5
5
.2
6
9
*
*
2
0
.0
4
4
2
.1
2
9
2
0
.0
9
7
8
.1
2
0
2
0
.2
2
8
*
6
.3
0
7
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.0
4
0
)
(3
.0
8
2
)
(0
.0
7
2
)
(2
.3
3
2
)
(0
.0
6
8
)
(7
.1
3
7
)
(0
.1
0
3
)
(7
.9
3
6
)
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
in
co
m
ed
[f
ro
m
0
-L
es
s
th
a
n
5
0
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
0
.0
6
1
*
2
.6
8
9
0
.0
6
0
*
*
2
0
.1
4
7
0
.0
9
3
*
5
.9
7
9
*
*
0
.1
1
3
*
5
.6
1
7
*
*
E
u
ro
to
1
7
-M
o
re
th
a
n
3
0
0
0
E
u
ro
]
S
td
.
E
rr
o
r
(0
.0
1
8
)
(1
.3
5
7
)
(0
.0
3
2
)
(0
.9
6
3
)
(0
.0
3
1
)
(3
.0
9
6
)
(0
.0
4
1
)
(2
.9
4
8
)
C
o
n
st
a
n
t
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
2
2
.6
5
4
*
2
4
.1
6
9
2
3
.3
0
4
*
3
2
.6
6
2
2
1
.0
7
9
*
2
4
6
.3
6
3
2
4
.2
6
0
*
2
1
9
5
.9
3
7
*
*
(c
o
n
ti
n
u
e
d
)
460 Health Policy and Planning, 2017, Vol. 32, No. 4
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/heapol/article-abstract/32/4/453/2593595
by Hungary EISZ Consortium user
on 17 May 2018
was higher in 2011 compared to 2010 (see interaction
Ukraine*2011, P<0.05). We also notice that in Ukraine in 2009,
payers paid less for the last hospitalization than in 2010 (P<0.05)
while in Bulgaria in 2011 payers paid less for the last hospitalization
(P<0.1). All associations mentioned above have a level of statistical
significance of P<0.05 or P0.10 (see Table 3 for more details).
A significantly higher number of users report informal payments
to a specialist compared to GPs (P<0.05). Also, when compared to
planned procedure not related to pregnancy/childbirth, significantly
larger share and higher payments are made for the last hospitaliza-
tion which include planned surgery (P<0.05 for the share and
P<0.1 for size) and emergency surgery not related to pregnancy/
childbirth (P<0.1 for the share and P<0.1 for size). Applying the
same base category, a higher share of informal payers for all types of
last hospitalizations which are related to pregnancy/childbirth
(P<0.05)is observed. We also observe that patients pay higher
amounts when the pregnancy/childbirth-related hospitalization is
characterized as a planned procedure and emergency surgery
(P<0.05), planned surgery and emergency procedure (P<0.1).
Moreover, higher informal payments occur when the reason for the
informal payment was ‘better services’ (P<0.01 for both last phys-
ician visit and last hospitalization models), when it was requested by
medical staff during last hospitalization (P<0.05) and lower
amounts are given under ‘better attention of physician’ reason
(P<0.1).
Those who use health care more frequently per year (P<0.05)
and those who are more aware of the size of the formal fee, have a
higher probability of paying informally (P<0.05 for out-patient
care and last physician models, P<0.05 for ‘sometimes’ indicator in
both in-patient care and P<0.1 for ‘always’ indicator in last hospi-
talization models) and make higher annual informal
payments(P<0.1 for ‘always’ indicator). In contrast, the model of
the last physician visit model suggests that poor knowledge of the
formal fee size is associated with higher amounts of informal pay-
ments for the last physician visit (P<0.05 for ‘sometimes’ indica-
tor). This inconsistency in the association between informal
payments and knowledge of the official fee is an important finding
which is discussed in the next section.
Regarding socio-demographic characteristics, a higher probabil-
ity of making informal payments is observed among female
(P<0.05 for out-patient and last hospitalization model, P<0.1 for
last physician model), among those who have health problems
(P<0.05 for annual models and last hospitalization model), and
among members of wealthier households(P<0.05 for annual and
last hospitalization models).A lower probability is noted among citi-
zens of towns (P<0.05 for annual models)
Results of the regression analyses on goods brought by
patients during the last hospitalization
Table 4 presents the results of the regression analyses carried out for
bringing pharmaceuticals, medical supplies and food and bed linen
for the last hospitalization. For all three types of goods, for 2010
(reference year), we find a significantly more extended practice of
bringing goods to the hospital in Ukraine as compared to Hungary
(P<0.05), as well as higher payments for pharmaceuticals brought
to the hospital in Ukraine (P<0.05) compared to Hungary.
Although there are no significant differences across years for
Hungary and Ukraine, the amount spent on medical supplies was
lower in Bulgaria in 2009 compared to 2010 (P<0.05). The same
holds for the share of in-patients with expenditures on pharmaceut-
icals which was lower in Bulgaria in 2011 compared to 2010T
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Table 4 Goods brought by patients during the last hospitalization—regression resultsa
Pharmaceuticals Medical supplies Food, linen
User brought
such goods
[0-No; 1-Yes]
SIZE in
Euro
User brought
such goods
[0-No; 1-Yes]
SIZE in
Euro
User brought
such goods
[0-No; 1-Yes]
Type of regression analysis Binary logistic Linear Binary logistic Linear Binary logistic
Country indicator: Hungary - base category
Bulgaria Coefficient 20.042 80.146 0.248 245.504 0.280
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.520) (48.706) (0.631) (172.529) (0.603)
Ukraine Coefficient 2.734* 101.244* 2.649* 231.984 2.614*
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.489) (35.869) (0.519) (128.525) (0.490)
Year: 2010 - base category
Year: 2009 Coefficient 20.157 222.016 20.184 35.688 20.033
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.433) (44.084) (0.540) (142.255) (0.471)
Year: 2011 Coefficient 0.349 3.630 0.221 70.798 20.205
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.395) (38.802) (0.491) (143.656) (0.476)
Country*Year interactions
Bulgaria*2009 Coefficient 21.138 268.903 20.446 2672.673* 1.014
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.859) (97.356) (0.957) (337.136) (0.783)
Bulgaria*2011 Coefficient 21.102** 253.526 21.114 247.134 20.019
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.626) (61.559) (0.814) (231.191) (0.747)
Ukraine*2009 Coefficient 20.513 222.418 20.078 244.128 20.752
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.654) (51.360) (0.683) (162.608) (0.630)
Ukraine*2011 Coefficient 20.712 11.884 20.250 244.235 0.005
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.572) (43.388) (0.594) (158.960) (0.578)
Fee awareness: Never – base category
Fee awareness: Sometimes Coefficient 20.090 20.419 0.309 12.867 0.071
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.257) (17.956) (0.267) (59.504) (0.253)
Fee awareness: Always Coefficient 0.180 224.552 0.139 15.025 0.080
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.334) (22.883) (0.361) (76.474) (0.333)
Type of hospitalization: Planned procedure not related to pregnancy or childbirth – base category
Emergency procedure not birth Coefficient 0.442 18.492 0.523 41.794 0.182
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.334) (21.887) (0.359) (76.474) (0.332)
Planned surgery not birth Coefficient 0.433 30.548 0.846** 342.950* 0.595
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.387) (30.792) (0.440) (100.910) (0.394)
Emergency surgery not birth Coefficient 0.272 85.522* 1.171* 241.794 0.124
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.519) (34.677) (0.527) (102.822) (0.505)
Planned procedure related to birth Coefficient 1.211* 45.414 1.897* 257.476 0.793
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.565) (42.316) (0.598) (125.489) (0.537)
Emergency procedure related to birth Coefficient 0.786 35.930 1.318* 14.901 0.372
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.498) (32.898) (0.499) (108.079) (0.461)
Planned surgery related to birth Coefficient 0.892 26.883 1.178** 2217.904 0.981**
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.583) (47.165) (0.627) (140.408) (0.560)
Emergency surgery related to birth Coefficient 1.367** 42.256 1.418** 29.162 1.016
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.746) (54.919) (0.782) (160.933) (0.738)
Length of hospitalization Coefficient 0.016 0.596 0.011 0.436 0.007
[Nights] Std. Error (0.010) (0.374) (0.009) (1.059) (0.007)
Age Coefficient 0.003 0.099 0.009 1.062 0.007
[Years] Std. Error (0.008) (0.586) (0.009) (2.086) (0.008)
Gender Coefficient 1.060* 21.296 1.310* -3.821 .863*
[0-Male; 1-Female] Std. Error (0.455) (32.929) (0.465) (104.133) (0.424)
Residence place: Village – base category
Residence place: Town Coefficient 0.072 35.232** 0.321 34.334 0.318
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.259) (18.878) (0.281) (62.300) (0.267)
Residence place: City Coefficient 0.014 6.663 0.062 262.924 0.572**
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.308) (21.972) (0.328) (70.929) (0.302)
Education Coefficient 0.083 20.035 0.115 37.835 20.145
[from 0-ISCED0 to 5-ISCED5þ 6] Std. Error (0.100) (7.388) (0.110) (23.666) (0.102)
Health problemsb Coefficient 1.119* 33.037 0.392 23.841 0.043
[0-No; 1-Yes] Std. Error (0.303) (21.080) (0.303) (71.002) (0.281)
Number of persons Coefficient 0.067 4.103 0.037 29.273 20.052
in household Std. Error (0.095) (6.208) (0.106) (19.459) (0.101)
(continued)
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(P<0.1). Fee awareness and length of hospitalization do not have a
significant association with the dependent variables.
The value of medical supplies brought by the patients is signifi-
cantly higher for planned surgery which is not related to pregnancy/
childbirth (P<0.05, compared to planned procedures not related to
childbirth) and the value of pharmaceuticals is significantly higher for
emergency surgery not childbirth related (P<0.05). Moreover, a
higher share of in-patients bring medical supplies for virtually all types
of hospitalization when compared to planned procedure not related
to pregnancy/childbirth except of emergency procedure not related to
childbirth. We observe some minor statistically significant socio-
demographic characteristics in the goods-related models, e.g. higher
share of females report of bringing pharmaceuticals, medical supplies
and bed linen, food into the hospital (P<0.05) as well as higher share
of in-patients who have health problems (P<0.05).
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that there are significant differences in
informal patient payments across countries and types of services, and
to a certain extent across the years. However, we cannot draw
strong conclusions about time trends since the time period studied is
only 2–3 years. The results are sensitive to some biases, as well.
Recall bias, which occurs in consumption and expenditure surveys,
has been reduced by using a moderate recall period for the questions
on last year’s experiences as well as by indicating the exact service
use in the questions on the last visit/hospitalization. The significance
level of the regression coefficients (P<0.1 in some cases) should be
addressed in further studies with a larger sample size. Also, the infor-
mal nature of the studied phenomenon provides a number of chal-
lenges, e.g. frank answers of respondents on the sensitive questions
as well as their ability to distinguish the informal part in the total
payments for health care services. As presented in Supplementary
Material, Table S2, these potential challenges were limited by asking
a question on informal payments after the general questions on ser-
vices use and total payments. Also, respondents were asked to in-
clude not only cash payments but also to assess in monetary terms
the gifts given. Since an insignificant number of respondents refused
to answer the questions on informal payment, we assume that the
sensitivity bias did not distort our results substantially. Moreover,
we have mainly focused on the cross-country comparison of the in-
formal payments. As cross-country studies serve mainly comparative
purposes, the research instrument should be kept as identical as pos-
sible (as it was in our study). Thus, it was impossible for us to reflect
in the questionnaire all country-specific regulations and other specif-
icities related to patient payments. In the view of this, single-country
studies will still be necessary to provide an in-depth analysis on pa-
tient payment arrangements in a given country.
Despite these potential limitations, our cross-country study pro-
vides evidence on the association of informal payments with factors
such as patients’ fee awareness, the purpose of the payment and its
initiator. The former appears statistically significant in virtually all
cases while the latter two factors as well as some socio-demographic
features of respondents appear significant on some occasions. In this
section, these findings are subsequently discussed.
Country context and the forms and scale of informal
payments
All our findings consistently show a lower extent of informal patient
payments in Bulgaria and a higher extent in Ukraine when compared
to Hungary, which is in accordance with previous studies (Health
Consumer Powerhouse 2010, Lewis 2007).
The difference between Hungary and Bulgaria is puzzling at first
glance given the traditionally better indicators in Hungary, e.g.
higher health care funding and political stability (Pavlova et al.
2012). One obvious explanation is the successful introduction and
functioning of a formal co-payment system in Bulgaria (Atanasova
et al. 2011) as opposed to Hungary, where such attempts failed in
the hospital and ambulatory care setting by and large a year after its
introduction in 2007, formal user charges were abolished (Baji et al.
2012). Thus, the relatively low share of informal payments in
Bulgaria could be explained by the existence of formal out-of-
pocket payments, which by decreasing the resources of households,
decreases their ability to pay informally. Also, the private health
care sector in Bulgaria is growing and provides formal alternatives
for patients who are willing to pay for better and quicker services.
Further, the lower extent of informal patient payments reported
in Bulgaria can be explained by the fact that in Bulgaria recent anti-
Table 4 (continued)
Pharmaceuticals Medical supplies Food, linen
User brought
such goods
[0-No; 1-Yes]
SIZE in
Euro
User brought
such goods
[0-No; 1-Yes]
SIZE in
Euro
User brought
such goods
[0-No; 1-Yes]
Type of regression analysis Binary logistic Linear Binary logistic Linear Binary logistic
Household income [from 0-Less than 50 Coefficient 20.082** 20.470 0.016 27.568 0.072**
Euro to 17-More than 3000 Euro] Std. Error (0.042) (3.009) (0.046) (9.656) (0.043)
Constant Coefficient 23.625* 2103.736 25.875* 266.836 23.208*
Std. Error (1.071) (79.506) (1.195) (277.410) (1.063)
Pseudo R Square/R Square 0.447 0.235 0.377 0.333 0.268
Number of observations 626 225 627 146 630
*P< 0.05;
**P 0.10.
aAmounts in Euro are used in the analyses. Firstly, in local currency for 2011 and 2009 amounts are converted to 2010 values based on Consumer Price Index
per country (source: World Bank), then converted from local currency to Euro based on average conversion rate for 2010 (source: ESB).
bIndicator of a presence of a severe or chronic health problem registered by a physician..
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corruption measures required for entering the EU, played an import-
ant role in the country and facilitated the creation of negative atti-
tudes towards informal patient payments (Atanasova et al. 2010,
Health Consumer Powerhouse 2010). In contrast, in Hungary and
Ukraine, the positive and/or indifferent attitudes towards informal
patient payments are more extensive (Stepurko et al. 2013).
Additionally, the inadequate public health care provision and the
need to further reduce government expenditure on health care may
hold back policy attempts in Hungary, as well as Ukraine to elimin-
ate informal payments (Baji et al. 2011). This also applies to
Bulgaria.
Still, a high share of the requested informal payments by out-
patient care providers in Bulgaria is a distinctive finding in our study
which can be attributed both to underfunding of the Bulgarian
health care sector (Dimova et al. 2012) and to the co-payment mech-
anism, which establishes a formal payment channel between the pa-
tient and the individual out-patient physician in the public health
care sector. This payment channel brings the money issue in the
patient-provider relation, and may well ease the request of informal
payments (Tambor et al. 2013). Moreover, from the patient perspec-
tive, imperfect knowledge about official fees is revealed in this
study.
Also, in case of hospital services in Bulgaria, where the collection
of formal co-payments is done by the hospital administration (not
directly by the physician), informal payments are relatively wide-
spread. This can be explained to a certain extent by the delayed
structural changes in Bulgarian hospital care as well as by the un-
clear payment regulations resulting in various quasi-formal hospital
fees, which are official but have no base in national legislation
(Atanasova et al. 2011). For a successful implementation of the re-
forms it is important to assure concordance of out- and in-patient
care reforms, as well as an adequate monitoring of the financial
flows in the health care sector.
In comparison to Bulgaria and Hungary, the Ukrainian case
seems to be a rather despairing one. The Ukrainian government
maintains the ‘status quo’ in providing goods to patients free of
charge at the point of use, while the quality- and access-related chal-
lenges in public health care faced in the 1990s have not been solved
(Lekhan et al. 2010, Rechel and McKee 2009). Nevertheless, the re-
sponsibility for sufficient service funding has been implicitly shifted
from the state to the patients. This is evidenced by higher private ex-
penditures most of which are informal or quasi-formal (Danyliv
et al. 2012). The latter, according to the definition of Gaal et al.
(2006), are also informal, if donations to charities are linked to an
actual care episode, despite the fact that the money goes through
formal payment channels. The inadequate health care funding in
Ukraine is also supported by our results on in-kind contributions by
patients. The lack of consistent policy goals, an adequate result-
oriented management culture, an up-to-date strong institutional
base further aggravate the quality and access problems in the
Ukrainian public health care provision.
On the other hand, the case of Bulgaria suggests that measures to
eliminate informal payments by the introduction of formal user fees,
are unlikely to be successful if shortages or chronic underfunding
persist as well as if reforms have uneven character. Our findings
show that patients continue to pay informally on top of the official
user fees. This is especially worrying for those who are not able to
pay for health care. Clearly, the inequity effects of formal co-
payments are going to be aggravated when these payments are com-
bined with informal payment requests on the side of the provider.
Fee-for-service and fee-for-goods payments (in kind
contribution)
Although lower than in Hungary, we find that informal patient pay-
ments are relatively widespread in Bulgaria as well, especially for
hospitalizations and, as we argued before, this has to be interpreted
within the context of total out-of-pocket payments. In particular,
we have explored payments for goods (e.g. pharmaceuticals, medical
supplies) that had to be provided to patients for free, but which pa-
tients were requested to bring with them for their hospital treatment.
As suggested by previous research, such requests are explained by
the staff by the lack of sufficient funding and consequently the ab-
sence of basic supplies for adequate service provision. Patients usu-
ally purchase these goods officially but outside the health care
settings, e.g. at private pharmacies (Ensor 2004, Fotaki 2009, Gaal
et al. 2006). Therefore, these payments are not formally registered
as treatment costs and these payments are not ‘fee-for-service’, but
‘fee-for-goods’ informal payments. Given these specialities it is im-
portant to separate them from informal cash payments in order to
understand better the out-of-pocket payment patterns in a country.
As a separate category of informal payments, they are referred to as
‘in-kind contribution’ in the literature (Gaal et al. 2006).They can
be also seen as quasi-informal payments since they are officially pur-
chased but brought to the hospital informally. Thus, they remain un-
registered with the hospital system.
While in Hungary and Bulgaria, about 15% of in-patients report
such payments, they are much more common in Ukraine. Overall,
the practice of patients bringing goods for hospital treatment shows
a government failure in health care provision (Cohen 2012,
Falkingham et al. 2010). However, when some patients have to
bring also their bed linen and food for their hospitalization, it is an
indicator of the major drawbacks in hospital care and the need of
immediate policy actions (Falkingham et al. 2010).
Still, we cannot deny the possibility that patients are asked to
bring goods for their hospital treatment not only due to the actual
absence of basic supplies in the hospital, but also due to the health
care providers’ misuse of their market power. Since the costs of these
goods are already included in the hospital reimbursement or hospital
budget, when patients bring the goods for their treatment, the hos-
pital ‘saves’ funds and can use the ‘savings’ for other purposes, e.g.
an increase of staff’s income. Such a situation occurs when adequate
monitoring and control of the hospital practice is absent.
Services and supply-side factors
As reported in our study and as confirmed by previous empirical evi-
dence (Szende and Culyer 2006, Tomini and Maarse 2011, Vian
et al. 2006), in-patient health care consumption leads to wider share
and higher amounts of informal patient payments compared to out-
patient care. We find that informal payments in case of surgery and
childbirth/pregnancy are higher compared to other in-patient ser-
vices, which is comparable to previous findings (Kornai 2000,
Shahriari et al. 2001). Also, we find lower informal payments for
GP services than for out-patient specialists, which are also reported
in previous studies (Vian et al. 2006).
Our results show that a considerable number of informal payers
in our study report ‘better attention’ as the main reason of informal
payments as well as the relevance of service quality and ‘better atten-
tion’ in the models which explain informal patient payments. In
Central and Eastern European countries, the lack of a favourable at-
titude of medical staff to patients may be found in physicians’ social
status inconsistency (when profession prestige and education does
not correspond to salary/income) that results in personal doctors’
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discordance, e.g. in aggressiveness and/or negligence of medical staff
(Cockcroft et al. 2011, Geschwender 1967). We also observe a posi-
tive relation between being asked to pay informally and the size of
informal payment for a hospitalization. In this regard, it is import-
ant to strengthen the norms of appropriate behaviour among health
care staff, i.e. clear policies for misconduct, professional training,
more involvement of professional committees and possibilities for
patients to complain when asked to pay informally (Lewis 2007).
These measures alone, however, are unlikely to be effective, if the
issue of selection, promotion and remuneration of physicians is not
addressed.
When we examine the size of the informal payment for hospital-
ization, obtaining better services also emerges as an important pur-
pose of informal payments. Thus, health care provision is organized
in a way that the patient is prompted to pay informally to obtain ad-
equate care. Specifically, governments have no resources or ability
to assure services with adequate quality for all, and lack the political
will to acknowledge this explicitly. Introducing formal charges for
better quality/access is unpopular and contradicts equity principles.
As a result, access to desirable attributes of health care services de-
pends on patients’ ability to pay informally (Cohen 2012, Gaal
2006). All these suggest that informal payments are rather a product
of system failure than the culture of gifts. Without addressing the
underlying shortage, including but not limited to salaries of medical
staff, and addressing the eroded social capital in health care, infor-
mal payments are likely to persist (Gaal and McKee 2004).
Knowledge of the size of the official payment for health
care services
Patients’ access to information on official fee schedules is highly im-
portant for an adequate health care system, and the key in the dis-
crimination of formal and informal patient payments (Allin et al.
2006, Ensor and Witter 2001, Fotaki 2009, Gaal and McKee 2005).
As our results suggest, in all three countries, more efforts are needed
in increasing patients’ knowledge about the entitlement to care.
Overall, we find that patients are poorly informed about the size
of the formal fees. Even in the case of Bulgaria, where formal co-
payments for health care services have been broadly applied since
2000, only about half of the patients always know always the exact
fee size. Contrary to previous results (Mokhtari and Ashtari 2012),
but with the exception of the size of informal payment for the last
physician visit, we observe a higher probability of informal pay-
ments among well-informed patients. This finding is more plausible,
insofar as only well-informed patients are in a position to distinguish
formal fees and additional payments made informally. Moreover,
better knowledge about official fees can be related to higher aware-
ness about health care utilization issues, e.g. how to increase the ac-
cessibility and quality of the services demanded. This finding
supports the assumption that informal payments are primarily not a
product of the lack of knowledge regarding entitlements to health
care. Complicated fee schemes and utilization regulations are none-
theless problematic (Belli et al. 2004), because they put service pro-
viders in a better position to take advantage of ill-informed patients
and extort informal payments as if formal user fees were due.
Therefore, the service utilization rules should be clear for any pa-
tient. Mobilization of nongovernmental organizations and civil soci-
eties, which are currently emerging in Central and Eastern European
countries, can help in achieving this objective.
In any case, the contradictory findings call for further research
with more detailed questions on fee awareness, related to actual epi-
sodes of care. From the research point of view, the respondents’
knowledge of official entitlements is indispensible to distinguish be-
tween formal and informal payments. Therefore, it is crucial for the
accurate estimation of the scale of the phenomenon. From the per-
spective of health policy, the provision of information on entitle-
ment to health care is an important prerequisite to eliminate
informal payments but good knowledge alone is unlikely to bring on
the required change in human behaviour. Along with financing and
structural changes, other structural factors, e.g. regulations and
anti-corruption policies are also important to eliminate informal
payments (Tambor et al. 2013).
Conclusions
The results of cross-country comparison confirm the existence of
widespread informal payments in Bulgaria, Hungary and Ukraine
though the scale and patterns vary across countries and services, and
to a certain extent over the years. Differences in regulatory mechan-
isms, the extent of ‘internal and external competition’, and the level
and sources of funding explain the cross-country diversity (Ensor
2004). It is common in all three countries, that informal patient pay-
ments (both ‘bribes and fees’) are a symptom of system failure and
provide a means for patients to obtain the health care they desire,
which the government is not able to guarantee.
Patients’ perception of poor service provision and hence the ap-
plication of ‘do-it-yourself’ policies or ‘inxit’ strategies (informal pay-
ments, using connections) in an attempt to benefit of better service
(Cohen 2012, Gaal et al.2004), may lead to an improvement of one’s
situation at the individual level, but distort the achievement of the
health policy objectives of the government at the level of the health
care system. Policy-makers should consider the purposes of informal
payments in the country and select corresponding measures to elim-
inate this type of payment. In case patients need better attention of
medical personnel, it is important to motivate the staff (via salaries,
bonuses, work conditions, trainings). At the same time, because of
the lack of regulations (protocols), sanctions, it is mainly physicians
(still underpaid and unmotivated) who make the decision on the ser-
vice they provide to patients (Thompson and Xavier 2004). Hence,
only wise regulations coupled with incentives/disincentives may de-
crease the level of informal payments for health care provision.
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